A low-grade form of ethical virtue emerges in us during childhood as we are repeatedly placed in situations that call for appropriate actions and emotions; but as we rely less on others and become capable of doing more of our own thinking, we learn to develop a larger picture of human life, our deliberative skills improve, and our emotional responses are perfected.
Aristotle holds that this same topography applies to every ethical virtue: First, there is the thesis that every virtue is a state that lies between two vices, one of excess and the other of deficiency.
Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain state or condition. By contrast, anger always moves us by presenting itself as a bit of general, although hasty, reasoning.
Aristotle makes it clear that the number of people with whom one can sustain the kind of relationship he calls a perfect friendship is quite small IX.
First, when a sick person experiences some degree of pleasure as he is being restored to health, the pleasure he is feeling is caused by the fact that he is no longer completely ill. And so in a way Socrates was right.
The sketchy answer he gives in Book I is that happiness consists in virtuous activity. He briefly mentions the point that pleasures compete with each other, so that the enjoyment of one kind of activity impedes other activities that cannot be carried out at the same time a20— His point, rather, may be that in ethics, as in any other study, we cannot make progress towards understanding why things are as they are unless we begin with certain assumptions about what is the case.
A Some agents, having reached a decision about what to do on a particular occasion, experience some counter-pressure brought on by an appetite for pleasure, or anger, or some other emotion; and this countervailing influence is not completely under the control of reason.
He lies between the coward, who flees every danger and experiences excessive fear, and the rash person, who judges every danger worth facing and experiences little or no fear. We thus have these four forms of akrasia: He has some degree of recognition that he must not do this now, but not full recognition.
It is important to bear in mind that when Aristotle talks about impetuosity and weakness, he is discussing chronic conditions. Either can lead to impetuosity and weakness. Little is said about what it is for an activity to be unimpeded, but Aristotle does remind us that virtuous activity is impeded by the absence of a sufficient supply of external goods b17— In Book X, he makes the point that pleasure is a good but not the good.
He vindicates the centrality of virtue in a well-lived life by showing that in the normal course of things a virtuous person will not live a life devoid of friends, honor, wealth, pleasure, and the like. Acting for the sake of another does not in itself demand self-sacrifice.
Surely someone who never felt this emotion to any degree could still live a perfectly happy life. But 2 others are less successful than the average person in resisting these counter-pressures. Although Aristotle is interested in classifying the different forms that friendship takes, his main theme in Books VIII and IX is to show the close relationship between virtuous activity and friendship.
In raising this question—what is the good? The happiest life is lived by someone who has a full understanding of the basic causal principles that govern the operation of the universe, and who has the resources needed for living a life devoted to the exercise of that understanding.
Then, when we engage in ethical inquiry, we can ask what it is about these activities that makes them worthwhile. Aristotle should therefore be acquitted of an accusation made against him by J. Aristotle explains what each of these states of mind is, draws various contrasts among them, and takes up various questions that can be raised about their usefulness.
Someone who has made no observations of astronomical or biological phenomena is not yet equipped with sufficient data to develop an understanding of these sciences. Defective states of character are hexeis plural of hexis as well, but they are tendencies to have inappropriate feelings.
If what we know about virtue is only what is said in Books II through V, then our grasp of our ultimate end is radically incomplete, because we still have not studied the intellectual virtue that enables us to reason well in any given situation. For, he says, the person who acts against reason does not have what is thought to be unqualified knowledge; in a way he has knowledge, but in a way does not.
It tells the individual that the good of others has, in itself, no valid claim on him, but that he should serve other members of the community only to the extent that he can connect their interests to his own.
Of course, Aristotle is committed to saying that anger should never reach the point at which it undermines reason; and this means that our passion should always fall short of the extreme point at which we would lose control. Even so, that point does not by itself allow us to infer that such qualities as temperance, justice, courage, as they are normally understood, are virtues.
So it is clear that exercising theoretical wisdom is a more important component of our ultimate goal than practical wisdom. What do I mean by honor? Book VII makes the point that pleasures interfere with each other, and so even if all kinds of pleasures are good, it does not follow that all of them are worth choosing.
Are these present in Book VI only in order to provide a contrast with practical wisdom, or is Aristotle saying that these too must be components of our goal?
I suppose that is why there seems to be a disconnect between the military sense of honor and how the general population thinks about honor. There is less shared understanding of many things in modern liberal society, and certainly honor is one of those ideas for which there is no common understanding.
But another part of us—feeling or emotion—has a more limited field of reasoning—and sometimes it does not even make use of it. And he clearly indicates that it is possible for an akratic person to be defeated by a weak pathos—the kind that most people would easily be able to control a9—b Aristotle says that unless we answer that question, we will be none the wiser—just as a student of medicine will have failed to master his subject if he can only say that the right medicines to administer are the ones that are prescribed by medical expertise, but has no standard other than this b18—Enron: What Caused the Ethical Collapse?
Introduction Kenneth Lay, former chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of Enron Corp., is quoted in Michael Novak’s book Business as a Calling: Work and the Examined Life as saying, “I was fully exposed to not only legal behavior but moral and ethical behavior and what that means from the.
So, although Aristotle holds that ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules, however complex, he insists that some rules are inviolable. The Starting Point for Practical Reasoning We have seen that the decisions of a practically wise person are not mere intuitions, but can be justified by a chain of reasoning.
Ethical Considerations T he consideration of ethics in research, and in general business for that matter, is of growing importance. It is, therefore, critical that you content analysis, meta-analysis, or literature review, it is unlikely that much of.
An Analysis of the Use of an Honor System on Question of Ethics PAGES 1. WORDS View Full Essay. More essays like this: analysis of use, honor system, question of ethics.
Not sure what I'd do without @Kibin - Alfredo Alvarez, student @ Miami University. analysis of use, honor system, question of ethics. Not sure. An introduction to the justice approach to ethics including a discussion of desert, distributive justice, retributive justice, and compensatory justice.
in more traditional terms, giving each person his or her due. Justice and fairness are closely related terms that are often today used interchangeably.
These studies suggest that.
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